Optimal Online Two-way Trading with Bounded Number of Transactions by Fung, Stanley P. Y.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
05
32
0v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
6 J
un
 20
17
Optimal Online Two-way Trading with Bounded
Number of Transactions
Stanley P. Y. Fung
Department of Informatics, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH,
United Kingdom. pyf1@leicester.ac.uk
Abstract. We consider a two-way trading problem, where investors buy
and sell a stock whose price moves within a certain range. Naturally they
want to maximize their profit. Investors can perform up to k trades,
where each trade must involve the full amount. We give optimal algo-
rithms for three different models which differ in the knowledge of how
the price fluctuates. In the first model, there are global minimum and
maximum bounds m and M . We first show an optimal lower bound of
ϕ (where ϕ = M/m) on the competitive ratio for one trade, which is
the bound achieved by trivial algorithms. Perhaps surprisingly, when we
consider more than one trade, we can give a better algorithm that loses
only a factor of ϕ2/3 (rather than ϕ) per additional trade. Specifically,
for k trades the algorithm has competitive ratio ϕ(2k+1)/3. Furthermore
we show that this ratio is the best possible by giving a matching lower
bound. In the second model, m and M are not known in advance, and
just ϕ is known. We show that this only costs us an extra factor of ϕ1/3,
i.e., both upper and lower bounds become ϕ(2k+2)/3. Finally, we con-
sider the bounded daily return model where instead of a global limit, the
fluctuation from one day to the next is bounded, and again we give opti-
mal algorithms, and interestingly one of them resembles common trading
strategies that involve stop loss limits.
1 Introduction
The model. We consider a scenario commonly faced by investors. The price of a
stock varies over time. In this paper we use a ‘day’ as the smallest unit of time,
so there is one new price each day. Let p(i) be the price at day i. The investor
has some initial amount of money. Over a time horizon of finite duration T , the
investor wants to make a bounded number of trades of this one stock. Each trade
(b, s) consists of a buy transaction at day b, followed by a sell transaction at day
s where s > b. (Thus one trade consists of two transactions.) Both transactions
are ‘all-in’: when buying, the investor uses all the money available, and when
selling all stock they currently own is sold. A sale must be made before the next
purchase can take place. Also, no short selling is allowed, i.e., there can be no
selling if the investor is not currently holding stock. When the end of the time
horizon is reached, i.e., on the last day, no buying is allowed and the investor
must sell off all the stocks that they still hold back to cash at the price of the
day.
There are a number of rationales for considering a bounded number of trades
and/or that trades must involve all the money available. Individual, amateur
investors typically do not want to make frequent transactions due to high trans-
action fees. Often transaction fees have a fixed component (i.e., a fixed amount
or a minimum tariff per transaction, irrespective of the trading amount) which
makes transaction fees disproportionally high for small trades. Frequent trad-
ing also requires constant monitoring of the markets which amateur investors
may not have the time or resources for; often they only want to change their
investment portfolios every now and then. Also, for investors with little money
available, it is not feasible or sensible to divide them into smaller pots of money,
in arbitrary fractions as required by some algorithms. The finiteness of the time
horizon (and that its length is possibly unknown as well) corresponds to sit-
uations where an investor may be forced to sell and leave the market due to
unexpected need for money elsewhere, for example.
Each trade with a buying price of p(b) and a selling price of p(s) gives a gain
of p(s)/p(b). This represents how much the investor has after the trade if they
invested 1 dollar in the beginning. Note that this is a ratio, and can be less than
1, meaning there is a loss, but we will still refer to it as a ‘gain’. If a series of
trades are made, the overall gain or the return of the algorithm is the product
of the gains of each of the individual trades. This correctly reflects the fact that
all the money after each trade is re-invested in the next.
Since investors make decisions without knowing future stock prices, the prob-
lem is online in nature. We measure the performance of online algorithms with
competitive analysis, i.e., by comparing it with the optimal offline algorithm
OPT that knows the price sequence in advance and can therefore make optimal
decisions. The competitive ratio of an online algorithm ONL is the worst possible
ratio of the return of OPT to the return of ONL, over all possible input (price)
sequences. The multiplicative nature of the definition of the return (instead of
specifying a negative value for a loss) means that the competitive ratio can be
computed in the normal way in the case of a loss: for example, if OPT makes a
gain of 2 and ONL makes a ‘gain’ of 1/3, then the competitive ratio is 6.
Three models on the knowledge of the online algorithm. We consider three dif-
ferent models on how the price changes, or equivalently, what knowledge the
online algorithm has in advance. In the first model, the stock prices are always
within a range [m..M ], i.e., m is the minimum possible price and M the maxi-
mum possible price. Both m and M are known to the online algorithm up front.
In the second model, the prices still fluctuate within this range, but m and M
are not (initially) known; instead only their ratio ϕ = M/m, called the fluc-
tuation ratio, is known. In both these models the length of the time horizon
(number of days) is unknown (until the final day arrives). In the third model,
called the bounded daily return model, there is no global minimum or maximum
price. Instead, the maximum fluctuation from day to day is bounded: namely,
the price p(i + 1) of the next day is bounded by the price p(i) of the current
day by p(i)/β ≤ p(i+ 1) ≤ αp(i) for some α, β > 1. This means the prices can-
not suddenly change a lot. Many stock markets implement the so-called ‘circuit
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breakers’ where trading is stopped when such limits are reached. Here α, β and
the trade duration T are known to the online algorithm. All three models are
well-established in the algorithms literature; see e.g. [1,5].
Previous results and related work. Financial trading and related problems are
obviously important topics and have been much studied from the online algo-
rithms perspective. A comprehensive survey is given in [8]. Here we only sample
some of the more important results and those closer to the problems we study
here. In the one-way search problem, the online player chooses one moment of
time to make a single transaction from one currency to another currency. Its
return is simply the price at which the transaction takes place. A reservation
price (RP) based policy is to buy as soon as the price reaches or goes above a
pre-set reservation price. It is well-known that, if m and M are known, the RP
policy with a reservation price of
√
Mm is optimal and achieves a competitive
ratio of
√
ϕ. If only ϕ is known, then no deterministic algorithm can achieve a
ratio better than ϕ. With the help of randomization, however, a random mix of
different RPs gives a competitive ratio of O(logϕ) if ϕ is known. Even if ϕ is
not known, a competitive ratio of O(logϕ · log1+ǫ(logϕ)) can be achieved. See
[5] for all the above results and more discussions.
In the one-way trading problem, the objective is again to maximize the final
amount in the other currency, but there can be multiple transactions, i.e., not all
the money has to be traded in one go. (This distinction of terminology between
search and trading is used in [5], but is called non-preemptive vs. preemptive in
[8]. We prefer calling them unsplittable vs. splittable here.) The relation between
one-way trading and randomized algorithms for one-way search is described in
[5]. Many variations of one-way search or one-way trading problems have since
been studied; some examples include the bounded daily return model [1,11],
searching for k minima/maxima instead of one [7], time-varying bounds [4],
unbounded prices [2], search with advice complexity [3], etc.
What we study here, however, is a two-way version of the unsplittable trading
problem1, which is far less studied. Here the online player has to first convert
from one currency (say cash) to another (a stock), hopefully at a low price, and
then convert back from the stock to cash at some later point, hopefully at a high
price. All the investment must be converted back to the first currency when or
before the game ends. This model is relevant where investors are only interested
in short term, speculative gains. For the models with known m,M or known ϕ
and with one trade, Schmidt et al. [9] gave a ϕ-competitive algorithm; it uses the
same RP for buying and selling. But consider the Do-Nothing algorithm that
makes no trades at all. Clearly it is also ϕ-competitive as ONL’s gain is 1 and
OPT’s gain is at most ϕ (if the price goes from m to M). A number of common
trading strategies, such as those based on moving averages, were also studied
in [8]. It was shown that they are ϕ2-competitive (and not better), which are
therefore even worse. It is easy to show that these algorithms have competitive
1 In the terminology of [5] this should be called ‘two-way search’, but we feel that the
term does not convey its application in stock market trading.
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ratios ϕk and ϕ2k respectively when extended to k trades. Schroeder et al. [10]
gave some algorithms for the bounded daily return model, without limits on the
number of trades. However, most of these algorithms tend to make decisions that
are clearly bad, have the worst possible performance (like losing by the largest
possible factor every day throughout), and have competitive ratios no better
than what is given by Do-Nothing.
Our results. In this paper we consider the two-way unsplittable trading prob-
lem where a bounded number k of trades are permitted, and derive optimal
algorithms. First we consider the model with known m and M . We begin by
considering the case of k = 1. Although some naive algorithms are known to
be ϕ-competitive and seemingly nothing better is possible, we are not aware of
any matching general lower bound. We give a general lower bound of ϕ, show-
ing that the naive algorithms cannot be improved. The result is also needed in
subsequent lower bound proofs.
It may be tempting to believe that nothing can beat the naive algorithm
also for more trades. Interestingly, we prove that for k ≥ 2 this is not true.
While naive algorithms like Do-Nothing are no better than ϕk-competitive,
we show that a reservation price-based algorithm is ϕ(2k+1)/3-competitive. For
example, when k = 2, it is ϕ5/3-competitive instead of trivially ϕ2-competitive.
Furthermore, we prove a matching lower bound, showing that the algorithm is
optimal.
Next, we consider the model where only ϕ is known, and give an algorithm
with a competitive ratio of ϕ(2k+2)/3, i.e., only a factor ϕ1/3 worse than that of
the preceding model. Again we show that this bound is optimal.
Finally we consider the bounded daily return model, and give two optimal
algorithms where the competitive ratio depends on α, β and T . For example,
with one trade and in the symmetric case α = β, the competitive ratio is α2T/3.
While this is exponential in T (which is unavoidable), naive algorithms could
lose up to a factor of max(α, β) every day, and Do-Nothing has a competitive
ratio of αT . One of the algorithms uses the ‘stop loss / lock profit’ strategy
commonly used in real trading; as far as we are aware, this is the first time
where competitive analysis justifies this common stock market trading strategy,
and in fact suggests what the stop loss limit should be.
2 Known m and M
In this section, where we consider the model with known m andM , we can with-
out loss of generality assume that m = 1. This is what we will do to simplify
notations. It also meansM and ϕ are equal and are sometimes used interchange-
ably.
Theorem 1. For k = 1, no deterministic algorithm has a competitive ratio
better than ϕ1−ǫ, for any ǫ > 0.
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Proof. Choose n = ⌈1/ǫ⌉ and define vi =M i/n for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. The following
price sequence is released until ONL buys: vn−1,M, vn−2,M, . . . , vi, M, . . . , v1,
M, v0. If ONL does not buy at any point, or buys at price M , then its return
is at most 1. Then OPT buys at v1 and sells at M to get a return of M
1−1/n.
So suppose ONL buys at vi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. (It cannot buy at v0 as it
is the last time step.) As soon as ONL bought, the rest of the sequence is not
released; instead the price drops to m and the game ends. ONL’s return is m/vi.
If i = n− 1, then OPT makes no trade and its return is 1, so competitive ratio
= vn−1/m = M
1−1/n. Otherwise, if i < n − 1, OPT buys at vi+1 (two days
before ONL’s purchase) and sells at the next day at price M , giving a return of
M/vi+1. The competitive ratio is therefore Mvi/(mvi+1) =M
1−1/n.
Thus in all cases the competitive ratio is at least M1−1/n ≥ ϕ1−ǫ. ⊓⊔
Note that the proof does not require ONL to use only one trade: it cannot
benefit even if it is allowed to use more trades. This fact will be used later in
Theorems 3 and 5.
For k > 1, we analyze the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 The reservation price algorithm, with known price range [m..M ]
Upon release of the i-th price p(i):
if i = T then
if currently holding stock then
sell at price p(T ) and the game ends
else
if p(i) ≤ M1/3 and currently not holding stock and not used up all trades then
buy at price p(i)
else if p(i) ≥ M2/3 and currently holding stock then
sell at price p(i)
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 has competitive ratio ϕ(2k+1)/3, for k ≥ 1.
Proof. First we make a few observations. We call a trade winning if its gain is
higher than 1, and losing otherwise. Any winning trade made by ONL has a gain
of at least M1/3. If the algorithm makes a losing trade, it must be a forced sale
at the end and the gain is not worse than M−1/3. Moreover, it follows that the
algorithm cannot trade anymore after it.
We consider a number of cases separately based on the sequence of win/loss
trades. If we use W and L to denote a winning and a losing trade respectively,
then following the above discussion, the possible cases are: nil (no trade), L,
W jL for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, and W j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. (Here W j denotes a sequence of
j consecutive W ’s.)
Case nil: Since ONL has never bought, the prices were never at or below M1/3
(except possibly the last one, but neither OPT nor ONL can buy there) and
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Fig. 1. Four cases illustrated, for k = 2. Horizontal axis is time, vertical axis is price.
Shaded regions are the regions where the prices cannot fall into. Green solid arrows
depict possible buying and selling actions of ONL, red dashed arrows for OPT. Top
left: case L, Top right: case W, Bottom left: case WL, Bottom right: case WW.
hence OPT’s return cannot be better than (M/M1/3)k = M2k/3. ONL’s
return is 1. So the competitive ratio is at most M2k/3.
Case L: Suppose ONL buys at time b1 and is forced to sell at the end. The prices
before b1 cannot be lower than M
1/3 (or else it would have bought) and the
prices after b1 cannot be higher thanM
2/3 (or else it would have sold). Thus,
it is easy to see (Figure 1) that OPT cannot make any trade with gain higher
thanM2/3. So the competitive ratio is at most (M2/3)k/M−1/3 =M (2k+1)/3.
Case W : Suppose ONL buys at time b1 and sells at time s1. Then before b1,
the prices cannot be below M1/3; between b1 and s1, the prices cannot be
higher thanM2/3; and after s1, the prices cannot be lower thanM
1/3. It can
be seen from Figure 1 that OPT can make at most one trade with gain M
(crossing time s1); any other trade it makes must be of gain at most M
2/3.
So the competitive ratio is at most M(M2/3)k−1/M1/3 = M2k/3.
Case W jL, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1: Similarly, we can partition the timeline into regions
(Figure 1), from which we can see that OPT can make at most j trades
of gain M and the rest have gain at most M2/3. Thus competitive ratio =
(M j(M2/3)k−j)/((M1/3)jM−1/3) = M (2k+1)/3.
Case W j, 1 < j ≤ k − 1: This can only be better than the previous case, as
OPT again can make at most j trades of gain M and the rest have gain at
most M2/3, but ONL’s return is better than the previous case.
Case W k: In this case the competitive ratio is simply Mk/(M1/3)k =M2k/3.
⊓⊔
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Theorem 3. No deterministic algorithm has a competitive ratio better than
ϕ(2k+1)/3−ǫ, for any ǫ > 0 and k ≥ 1.
Proof. The prices are released in up to k rounds. The final round k is a special
round. For all other rounds, we maintain the following invariants. For each 1 ≤
i ≤ k− 1, just before the i-th round starts, OPT completed exactly i− 1 trades,
is holding no stock, and accumulated a return of exactly M i−1, while ONL
completed at most i− 1 trades, is holding no stock, and accumulated a return of
at most M (i−1)/3. So the competitive ratio up to this point is at leastM2(i−1)/3.
For any i < k, round i begins with the price sequence M1/3,M,M1/3,M, . . .
until either ONL buys or k− i such pairs of oscillating prices have been released.
If ONL does not buy at any point, then the round ends. Clearly, ONL maintains
its variants. OPT makes k − i trades giving a total gain of (M2/3)k−i in this
round, and thus the accumulated competitive ratio is M2(k−1)/3. It also used
(i − 1) + (k − i) = k − 1 trades. Any remaining intermediate rounds are then
skipped and we jump directly to the special last round k.
Otherwise, assume ONL buys at one of the M1/3 prices (M is clearly even
worse). The rest of that sequence will not be released. Instead, the price sequence
that follows is m,M2/3,m,M2/3, . . . until either ONL sells or k− i+1 such pairs
of oscillating prices were released. If ONL does not sell at any of these, then
the price drops to m and the game ends (with no further rounds, not even the
special round). ONL’s gain in this round is M−1/3. OPT uses all its remaining
k − i + 1 trades and gains (M2/3)k−i+1. Combining with the previous rounds,
the competitive ratio is at most M2(i−1)/3M2(k−i+1)/3/M−1/3 =M (2k+1)/3.
Otherwise ONL sells at one of the M2/3 prices (m is even worse). The rest
of that sequence will not be released; instead the price goes up to M and this
round ends. OPT’s gain in this round is M by making one trade from m to M ;
ONL gains M1/3. Thus the invariants are maintained and we move on to the
next round. (Regarding the invariant that ONL is not holding stock at the end
of the round, we can assume w.l.o.g. that ONL does not buy at the last price
M , since clearly it cannot make a profit doing so. In any case, even if it does
buy, it can be treated as if it were buying at the beginning of the next round.)
Finally, if we arrive at round k, then the same price sequence as in Theorem 1
is used to give an additional factor of M1−ǫ to the competitive ratio. Note that
at the start of this round, OPT has one trade left, and ONL has one or more
trades left, but that will not help. Thus the competitive ratio is not better than
M2(k−1)/3+1−ǫ = M (2k+1)/3−ǫ. ⊓⊔
3 Known ϕ only
For k = 1Do-Nothing is clearly still ϕ-competitive, and Theorem 1 still applies
here, so we focus on k > 1. We adapt Algorithm 1 by buying only when it is
certainly ‘safe’, i.e., when it is certain that the price is within the lowest ϕ1/3
of the actual price range, and sells when it gains ϕ1/3. The formal description
is given in Algorithm 2. Let Mt be the maximum price observed up to and
including day t. Note that Mt is a stepwise increasing function of t.
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Algorithm 2 The reservation price algorithm, with known ϕ
Upon release of the i-th price p(i):
if i = T then
if currently holding stock then
sell at price p(T ) and the game ends.
else
if i = 1 then
M1 := p(1)
else
Mi := max(Mi−1, p(i))
if p(i) ≤ Mi/ϕ
2/3 and currently not holding stock and not used up all trades then
buy at price p(i)
else if currently holding stock bought at price p(b) and p(i) ≥ ϕ1/3p(b) then
sell at price p(i)
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 has competitive ratio ϕ(2k+2)/3, for any k ≥ 2.
Proof. Clearly ONL gets the same as in Theorem 2: each winning trade has gain
at least ϕ1/3 and a losing trade, which can only appear as the last trade, has
gain at least ϕ−1/3. The difference is in how we bound OPT’s gain.
In the case of W k (ONL makes k winning trades) then the same argument
as Theorem 2 applies, so in the following we only consider the case where ONL
did not use up all its trade, i.e., it is always able to buy if it is not holding.
A sell event happens at a day when ONL sells and makes a profit (i.e.,
excludes the forced sale at the end). An M-change event happens at day t if
Mt 6= Mt−1. Each OPT trade (b∗, s∗) can be classified into one of the following
types:
(1) There is at least one sell event during [b∗, s∗]. Clearly the number of such
OPT trades is limited by the number of sell events. Each such trade can gain
up to ϕ.
(2) There is no sell event during [b∗, s∗], and at b∗ ONL is holding or buying. Sup-
pose ONL’s most recent purchase is at time b ≤ b∗. Then p(b) ≤Mb/ϕ2/3 ≤
Mb∗/ϕ
2/3. It is holding stock throughout and still did not sell at s∗ (or is
forced to sell if s∗ is the last day), hence p(s∗) < p(b)ϕ1/3 ≤Mb∗/ϕ1/3. But
clearly p(b∗) ≥Mb∗/ϕ, hence the gain of OPT is at most ϕ2/3.
(3) There is no sell event during [b∗, s∗], at b∗ ONL is neither holding nor buying,
and there is no M-change event in (b∗, s∗]. We have p(b∗) > Mb∗/ϕ
2/3 as
otherwise ONL would have bought at b∗. Clearly p(s∗) ≤Ms∗ = Mb∗ . Hence
the gain of OPT is p(s∗)/p(b∗) < ϕ2/3.
(4) There is no sell event during [b∗, s∗], at b∗ ONL is neither holding nor buying,
and there is/are M-change event(s) in (b∗, s∗]. Suppose there are a total of x
such OPT trades, (b∗1, s
∗
1), (b
∗
2, s
∗
2), . . . , (b
∗
x, s
∗
x), in chronological order. Note
that p(b∗i ) > Mb∗i /ϕ
2/3 or else ONL would have bought at b∗i . So for all
i, p(b∗i+1) > Mb∗i+1/ϕ
2/3 ≥ Ms∗
i
/ϕ2/3 ≥ p(s∗i )/ϕ2/3. Thus the total gain of
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these x trades is
x∏
i=1
p(s∗i )
p(b∗i )
=
1
p(b∗1)
p(s∗1)
p(b∗2)
· · · p(s
∗
x−1)
p(b∗x)
p(s∗x)
1
<
p(s∗x)
p(b∗1)
(ϕ2/3)x−1 ≤ ϕ(ϕ2/3)x−1 = ϕ(2x+1)/3.
Suppose ONL makes y winning trades and one losing trade. Then OPT makes
at most y trades of type (1), gaining at most ϕy from those. Then, if x of OPT’s
trades are of type (4), they in total gives another gain of at most ϕ(2x+1)/3. The
remaining trades are of types (2) and (3), gaining ϕ2/3 each. The competitive
ratio is therefore at most
ϕyϕ(2x+1)/3ϕ2(k−x−y)/3
ϕy/3ϕ−1/3
= ϕ(2k+2)/3.
If ONL makes y < k winning trades and no losing trade, the competitive
ratio can only be better, as OPT’s return is as above but ONL’s is ϕ1/3 better.
⊓⊔
Theorem 5. No deterministic algorithm is better than ϕ(2k+2)/3−ǫ-competitive,
for any ǫ > 0 and k ≥ 2.
Proof. Again there will be a number of rounds. Round 1 is special, in that OPT
will get a factor of ϕ better than ONL but will afterwards reveal knowledge of
m and M . Rounds 2 to k are then similar to Theorem 3.
Round 1: The first price is 1. If ONL does not buy, then the price goes up to
ϕ. OPT makes one trade and gains ϕ. Now we know the range is [1..ϕ], and we
can assume w.l.o.g. that ONL does not buy at ϕ. Then the round ends. At the
end of this round, both OPT and ONL are not holding stock, OPT made one
trade and ONL none, but ONL is a factor of ϕ behind in the return.
Otherwise, if ONL buys at 1, then the subsequent price sequence is 1/ϕ, 1,
1/ϕ, 1, . . . for up to k such pairs, until ONL sells. Now we know the range is
[1/ϕ..1]. Without loss of generality we can assume ONL does not sell at 1/ϕ
since it is clearly the lowest possible price. If ONL does not sell at any point,
then the game ends with no further rounds. OPT makes k trades gaining ϕk,
and ONL’s gain is 1. The competitive ratio is ϕk, which is at least ϕ(2k+2)/3. If
ONL sells at some point with price 1, then the sequence stops and this round
ends. OPT buys at 1/ϕ and sells at 1, getting a gain of ϕ. ONL’s gain is 1. Both
OPT and ONL used one trade, and OPT is a factor of ϕ ahead of ONL.
Each of rounds 2 to k − 1 are the same as the intermediate rounds in Theo-
rem 3, with OPT gaining a factor of ϕ2/3 ahead of ONL in each round.
Finally, in round k we use the same price sequence in Theorem 1, which gives
an extra factor of ϕ1−ǫ. Note that ONL may have more trades left then OPT (in
addition to the same reason as in Theorem 3, in round 1 ONL may have done
no trade), but again it is not useful for ONL. ⊓⊔
4 Bounded daily return, known duration
Recall that in this model, the prices are bounded by p(i)/β ≤ p(i + 1) ≤ αp(i)
for some α, β > 1. Trades can take place at days 0, 1, . . . , T .
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Theorem 6. No deterministic algorithm has a competitive ratio better than
αT (2k log β)/((k+1) log β+k logα).
Proof. The adversary strategy is very simple and natural: whenever ONL is not
holding stock, the price goes up by a factor of α every day, and while it is holding
stock it goes down by β every day. Let the ONL trades be (bi, si), i = 1, . . . , k.
(If there are fewer than k trades, dummy ones with bi = si can be added.) For
1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, define t2i−1 = bi − si−1 and t2i = si − bi. (For convenience
define s0 = 0 and bk+1 = T .) ONL’s return is 1/(β
t2βt4 · · ·βt2k). OPT’s optimal
actions, if allowed k + 1 trades, is to hold during the exact opposite intervals as
ONL, i.e., buy at si and sell at bi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. But since it can make at
most k trades, its possible course of actions include skipping one of those trades,
or making one of the trades ‘span across two intervals’, e.g., buying at si and
selling at bi+2. Thus OPT’s return is one of
αt3αt5 · · ·αt2k+1 , αt1αt5 · · ·αt2k+1 , . . . , αt1αt3 · · ·αt2k−1 ,
αt1αt3 · · ·αt2k+1/βt2 , αt1αt3 · · ·αt2k+1/βt4 , . . . , αt1αt3 · · ·αt2k+1/βt2k .
To attain the worst competitive ratio, these returns should be equal, which
means t1 = t3 = · · · = t2k+1 and t2 = t4 = · · · = t2k. This further implies
αkt1 = α(k+1)t1/βt2 , which gives αt1 = βt2 . Together with t1 + · · · + t2k+1 =
(k + 1)t1 + kt2 = T , this gives
t1 =
log β
(k + 1) logβ + k logα
T, t2 =
logα
(k + 1) log β + k logα
T
and thus the competitive ratio is at least
αkt1/(1/βkt2) = α2kt1 = αT (2k log β)/((k+1) log β+k logα).
⊓⊔
Algorithm 3 Static algorithm for known α, β and T .
Set t1 =
log β
(k+1) log β+k logα
T and t2 =
logα
(k+1) log β+k logα
T , rounding to nearest integers.
Upon release of the i-th price p(i):
if i = T then
if currently holding stock then
sell at price p(T ) and the game ends
else
if have not been holding stock for t1 days and not used up all trades then
buy at price p(i)
else if have been holding stock for t2 days then
sell at price p(i)
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Theorem 7. Algorithm 3 has competitive ratio αT (2k log β)/((k+1) log β+k logα).
Proof. In what follows we ignore the roundings on t1 and t2. We argue that the
worst case price sequence is exactly the one described in the proof of Theorem 6.
Consider an arbitrary day i > 0. Suppose at day i ONL is holding stock or selling.
If p(i−1)/β < p(i), i.e., the price change from day i−1 to i is not the maximum
possible drop, we raise p(i− 1) to βp(i) and make a corresponding change to all
earlier prices, i.e., multiply each of them by a factor of βp(i)/p(i− 1).
ONL’s buy/sell decisions are unchanged as they do not depend on the prices
at all. For any ONL trade completed (bought and sold) on or before day i− 1,
their gains are unaffected since both buying and selling prices are multiplied by
the same factor. For the one trade where it is holding or selling at day i, ONL
loses by a factor of βp(i)/p(i − 1) since the buying price of this trade is raised
but the selling price is not. All future trades are unaffected. For the moment
assume OPT’s trading decisions also remain unchanged. If OPT is holding or
selling at day i, then it suffers the same change as ONL, so the competitive ratio
is unchanged. Otherwise its gain is not affected and hence the competitive ratio
increases.
Similarly, suppose at day i ONL is buying or is not holding stock. If p(i −
1)α > p(i), i.e., the price change from day i−1 to i is not the maximum possible
rise, we lower p(i− 1) to p(i)/α and make a corresponding change to all earlier
prices, i.e., multiply each of them by a factor of p(i)/(αp(i − 1)). For any ONL
trade already completed before day i, its gain is unaffected since both buying and
selling prices are multiplied by the same factor. All future trades are unaffected.
For OPT, if it is buying or holding at day i − 1, then it gains from the lower
buying price while the selling price (on or after day i) is unchanged. Otherwise
its gain is unaffected as in ONL. Hence the competitive ratio can only increase.
Applying this to each day successively, we can without loss of generality
assume the prices follow a zig-zag pattern as described in the proof of Theorem 6.
Now, the optimal trades for this new price sequence may not be the same as the
original sequence, but that can only improve OPT’s return. The argument in
the proof of Theorem 6 establishes the ratio between OPT and ONL for such a
zig-zag price sequence. This proves the upper bound for our algorithm. ⊓⊔
Algorithm 3 may feel unnatural since it does not depend on the price sequence
at all (this is called ‘static’ in [1]). But we prove that the following variation of
the algorithm has the same competitive ratio: it sells only when the current
price falls below h/βt2 where h is the highest price seen since the last purchase.
This coincides with the ‘stop loss’ strategy very common in real trading (more
precisely ‘trailing stop’ [6] where the stop loss limit is not fixed but tracks the
highest price seen thus far, to potentially capture the most profit).
Theorem 8. Algorithm 4 has competitive ratio αT (2k log β)/((k+1) log β+k logα).
Proof. Recall that αt1 = βt2 . Let r denote this common value, and the competi-
tive ratio we want to prove is then equal to r2k. Roughly speaking, our approach
is to partition the time horizon so that, in each partition, x trades in OPT are
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Algorithm 4 Stop loss based algorithm for known α, β and T .
Set t1 and t2 as in Algorithm 3.
Upon release of the i-th price p(i):
if i = T then
if currently holding stock then
sell at price p(T ) and the game ends
else
if have not been holding stock for t1 days and not used up all trades then
buy at price p(i)
set h = p(i)
else if currently holding stock then
set h = max(h, p(i))
sell at price p(i) if p(i) < h/βt2
associated to y trades in ONL such that the ratio between their gains is at most
rx+y. Since each of OPT and ONL makes at most k trades, this proves the
theorem.
Suppose ONL completed ℓ trades, ℓ ≤ k. Denote by (bi, si) ONL’s i-th trade.
For technical reasons, also define b0 = s0 = 0 and bℓ+1 = sℓ+1 = T . Let Hi =
[bi, si], 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, be the i-th holding period, i.e., the (closed) time interval where
ONL is holding stock in its i-th trade, and let Ni = (si−1, bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ + 1,
be the (open) i-th non-holding period. H0 is the holding period for the trivial
trade (b0, s0) defined for analysis purposes only. If Hℓ does not contain time T
(i.e., ONL is not holding stock till the end where a forced sale happens), also
define Hℓ+1 = [bℓ+1, sℓ+1] for the trivial trade (bℓ+1, sℓ+1). Each Ni has length
exactly t1, and each Hi (except H0 and Hℓ+1) has length at least t2. Let hi be
the highest price during Hi. We first show the following properties:
(1) For any two days x and y in the same Hi, where x < y, we have p(y) ≥
p(x)/r. This is because at day y the highest price seen thus far is at least
p(x), and so the stop loss threshold is at least p(x)/r. (In fact p(y) could be
up to one factor of β smaller since ONL sells as soon as this limit is reached,
but this difference can be ignored.) As a direct consequence, p(si) ≥ hi/r.
(If day T arrives before the threshold is reached then the final sale is made
at a price higher than this.)
(2) Without loss of generality we can assume p(bi+1) = p(si)r. The reason is
that during any Ni, the price sequence can be transformed so that it goes up
by α every day, by the same argument as in Theorem 7, since ONL always
waits the same number of days before the next purchase and is independent
of price changes during this period. Then the price rises by a factor of αt1
over this non-holding period.
(3) OPT would not buy or sell strictly within any Ni. This follows from the
argument in (2), since it is easy to see that OPT only buys at local minima
and sells at local maxima.
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Consider an OPT trade (b∗, s∗). Suppose b∗ falls withinHu and s
∗ falls within
Hv, where v ≥ u. Its gain g∗ is equal to
g∗ =
p(s∗)
p(b∗)
≤ hv
p(bu)/r
≤ p(sv)r
p(bu)/r
=
p(sv)
p(bu)
r2
where the inequalities are due to (1). Note that if u = 0, then p(b∗) = p(bu) and
thus a factor of r can be removed from the above bound; similarly if v = ℓ + 1
then p(sv) = hv and another factor of r can be removed. Thus, if we define an
indicator variable Ii which is 0 if i = 0 or i = ℓ+ 1 and 1 otherwise, then
g∗ ≤ p(sv)
p(bu)
rIu+Iv
Then
g∗ ≤ p(sv)
p(bv)
p(bv)
p(sv−1)
p(sv−1)
p(bv−1)
p(bv−1)
p(sv−2)
. . .
p(su+1)
p(bu+1)
p(bu+1)
p(su)
p(su)
p(bu)
rIu+Iv
=
p(sv)
p(bv)
r
p(sv−1)
p(bv−1)
r . . . r
p(su)
p(bu)
rIu+Iv = rv−u+Iu+Iv
v∏
i=u
gi
where gi = p(si)/p(bi) is the gain of the i-th ONL trade. The second last equality
is due to (2).
If no other OPT trade sells during Hu or buys during Hv, we can associate
this OPT trade with these v − u+ 1 ONL trades (bu, su), . . . , (bv, sv). No other
OPT trades would be associated with these ONL trades. But if other OPT trades
fall withinHu orHv then this cannot be done directly. Instead we consider groups
of OPT trades, determined as follows. Suppose there are two OPT trades (b∗1, s
∗
1)
and (b∗2, s
∗
2) such that the earlier one sells at the same holding period as the later
one buys, i.e., b∗1 is in Hu, s
∗
1 and b
∗
2 are in the same Hv, and s
∗
2 is in Hw, where
u ≤ v ≤ w. Then p(b∗2) ≥ p(s∗1)/r due to (1), and so (p(s∗2)/p(b∗2))(p(s∗1)/p(b∗1)) ≤
(p(s∗2)/p(b
∗
1))r, and by losing a factor of r we can replace the two OPT trades
with one (b∗1, s
∗
2).
By repeatedly applying the argument, we can partition the time horizon into
disjoint parts: in part j, OPT has xj trades (b
∗
j,1, s
∗
j,1), . . . , (b
∗
j,xj
, s∗j,xj ), b
∗
j,1 falls
within some Huj and s
∗
j,xj
falls within some Hvj , and no other OPT trade sells
duringHuj or buys duringHvj (otherwise they would have been merged into this
as well). ONL made a total of yj = vj −uj+1 trades here, each of gain gj,i. The
xj OPT trades, each of gain g
∗
j,i, have been merged into one trade (b
∗
j,1, s
∗
j,xj
) of
gain g∗j , such that g
∗
j ≥
∏
i g
∗
j,i/r
xj−1. Since g∗j ≤ rvj−uj+Iuj+Ivj
∏vj
i=uj
gj,i, we
have
∏
i
g∗j,i ≤ rxj−1rvj−uj+Iuj+Ivj
vj∏
i=uj
gj,i = r
xj+yjrIuj+Ivj−2
vj∏
i=uj
gj,i
Over all partitions, therefore, the overall gains ratio between OPT and ONL
is
∏
j
(∏
i g
∗
j,i/
∏vj
i=uj
gj,i
)
≤∏j rxj+yjrIuj+Ivj−2.
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If none of uj or vj involve the two trivial holding periods H0 and Hℓ+1, then
all Iuj and Ivj are equal to 1, and
∑
j xj ≤ k,
∑
j yj ≤ ℓ. Hence
∏
j
rxj+yjrIuj +Ivj−2 ≤ rk+ℓr1+1−2 . . . r1+1−2 ≤ r2k
If one trivial holding period is involved, e.g., b∗1,1 falls intoH0 and thus u1 = 0,
then Iu1 = 0 and
∑
j yj ≤ ℓ+ 1. Then
∏
j
rxj+yjrIuj +Ivj−2 ≤ rk+ℓ+1r0+1−2r1+1−2 . . . r1+1−2 ≤ r2k
Finally if both trivial holding periods are involved, i.e., b∗1,1 falls into H0 and
the last sale falls into Hℓ+1, then
∏
j
rxj+yjrIuj +Ivj−2 ≤ rk+ℓ+2r0+1−2r1+1−2 . . . r1+1−2r1+0−2 ≤ r2k
⊓⊔
5 Conclusion
There are still many possible directions that can be explored. Some examples in-
clude randomized algorithms, allowing short-selling, trading two or more stocks,
or allowing the money to be split into a small number of bets (e.g., the investor
can sell half of its shares first, and potentially let the other half to earn more
profit). The last one models the intermediate case between the splittable and
unsplittable versions of the problem.
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